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Introduction
In July 2016, Turkey was shaken by a bloody
coup attempt. Although the would-be putschists
failed, their insurgency led to an unprecedented
reshuffling of Turkey’s political economic and
socio-cultural landscapes. Notwithstanding the
critical reverberations on the army, judiciary, law
enforcement and civil society, the abortive coup set
in motion a massive purge of civil servants, closure
of media outlets, arrests of journalists, and blocking
of websites and social media accounts.
This report offers an examination of the
evolution of internet policy in Turkey from the early
2000s to the post-coup conjuncture. It begins with
an overview of internet legislation in Turkey during
the 2000s under the AKP government (Justice and
Development Party), and proceeds to discuss the
deployment of different forms of control between
2013-2016 to contain the fallout from political
and security crises and the potentially disruptive
affordances of social media platforms.1 Following
this overview, the report focuses on the emerging
policy developments and online restrictions in the
aftermath of the coup attempt, which include 1) the
closure of the TIB—Turkey’s telecommunications
authority, 2) direct government control of ISPs
(Internet Service Providers) and interception of
digital communications by way of decree laws, 3)
facilitation of social media censorship by means of
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube content removals
R. Deibert and R. Rohozinski, ‘Control and Subversion in
Russian Cyberspace’ In Access Controlled: The Shaping of
Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace, edited by R. Deibert,
J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski and J. Zittrain, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2010, pp. 15-34.

1
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and 4) coordinated online harassment campaigns
by pro-government users against alleged coup
planners, Kurdish activists and government critics in
general.
To gain insights into these developments, this
report draws extensively on literature both in
Turkish and English and is based on the following
methods: 1) document analysis of existing internet
legislation, Turkish Official Gazette announcements
concerning the decree laws, and government officials’
statements, 2) quantitative analysis of open source
data on social media censorship (crowdsourced data
on banned websites; Twitter, Facebook and Google
transparency reports; Lumen database on Turkish
court orders; traffic data on throttling), 3) analysis
of Twitter activity in the months before and after
the coup attempt, and 4) select semi-structured
interviews with internet activists and legal scholars.
The key finding of the report is that the AKP’s
post-coup strategies concerning the internet are
culminating in a distributed network of government
and non-government actors using hard and soft
forms of control. While the AKP continues to deploy
existing Internet Law, Anti-Terror Law and Press Law
provisions and further expands its online hegemony
by way of decree laws, its post-coup internet policy
has also come to rely on the opaque activities of
users and groups who are affiliated with government
officials, party members and partisan media outlets
and whose primary objective is to target and harass
government critics on social media, and intimidate
those who dissent. As these actors take on the
responsibility of online monitoring, hacking and
“snitching,” it becomes increasingly difficult for users
and activists to trace online restrictions to a specific
government agency or legislation and to seek legal
remedies.

FEBRUARY 2017

Overview of Turkey’s
Internet Policy 			
I. 1993-2007: Absence of regulation
In the early 1990s, internet in Turkey was in the
purview of academic and research institutions.
Following the creation of a national backbone in
1996 and the consequent rise of a competitive ISP
market, internet became a commercial medium
in the latter half of the decade, registering steady
growth in use and introducing various technological
and socio-cultural changes. However, it remained
largely unregulated primarily because of the thencoalition governments’ disregard for the need to
develop new policies for a new medium, and was
primarily managed and controlled by the courts that
focused on criminalization of certain online activities.
The earliest examples of such court decisions
can be traced back to separate cases in 1997 and
2001 when two individuals were prosecuted for
their statements on online forums that allegedly
criticized and offended the Turkish police and state
institutions.2
On the other hand, the first website blocking took
place in 2002 when a military court ordered a website
to shut down due to the publication of documents
concerning alleged corruption within the Turkish Air
Force.3 The first mass website blocking happened in
2005-2006 when more than a dozen websites were
blocked by the courts on copyright infringement
grounds because they provided hyperlinks to
downloadable audio files or software to obtain
such files.4 These practices of ad hoc criminalization
and prosecution in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
K. Altintas, T. Aydin and V. Akman, ‘Censoring the
Internet: The Situation in Turkey’, First Monday, June 3,
2002, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/962/883, (accessed November 27, 2016).
3
S. Özalp, ‘Genel Kurmay Yolsuzluk.com Sitesini
Kapattırdı’, Türk İnternet, March 4, 2002. Accessed November 25, 2016 http://www.turk-internet.com/portal/
yazigoster.php?yaziid=3352, (accessed November 27,
2016).
4
M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, ‘Internet censorship in
Turkey’, Internet Policy Review, Volume 4, Issue 2, DOI:
10.14763/2015.2.366, https://policyreview.info/articles/
analysis/internet-censorship-turkey, (accessed November
27, 2016).
2
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and the absence of a systematic policy-making and
public debate concerning the role of the internet in
society set the stage for more stringent policies in
following years.

II. 2007-2013: Regulation-cum-control
Turkey passed its first internet-specific legislation
in 2007, which was titled “Law No. 5651, Regulation
of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of
Crimes Committed by means of Such Publications.” It
was propelled by fears around moral issues involving
teen sexuality, pornography, drug use, video games
and violence that swept the nation in the early 2000s,
and was therefore designed to protect users from socalled illegal and harmful content. The “Internet Law”
as it was commonly known, charged the Presidency
of Telecommunications and Communication (TIB in
its Turkish acronym) with administrative duties such
as monitoring content and mandating hosting and
access providers to combat categorical crimes. The
law set forth seven categorical crimes (incitement
to suicide, facilitation of the use of narcotics, child
pornography, obscenity, prostitution, facilitation of
gambling, and slandering of the legacy of Ataturk—
the founder of modern Turkey), and stipulated
that a website could be blocked by court order or
an administrative order issued by the TIB if it was
found to be committing one of these crimes. It also
obliged hosting and access providers to monitor
online content that was transmitted through their
infrastructure and required them to ban access
to illegal content once they were served with a
court order or a TIB-issued notice. According to
the Internet Law, mass use providers (e.g. internet
cafes) were required to obtain “activity certificates”
from local authorities and to block access to illegal
content by using the TIB-approved filters.
To penalize online content that fell outside the
purview of the Internet Law, Turkish authorities
deployed other legislation including the Penal Code
to criminalize online speech that insults the Turkish
nation, government agencies or the military; the
Anti-Terror Law to curb political speech regarding
the Kurdish issue and ethnic minority rights; and
the Intellectual Property Law to penalize content
providers for illegally publishing copyrighted
material.
Given the combined use of the Internet Law
with the above-mentioned legislation, the late
Page 5
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Table 1: Number of websites blocked in Turkey
Year

Annual

Cumulative

2008

1,310

1,310

2009

4,644

5,954

2010

2,593

8,547

2011

7,012

15,559

2012

7,082

22,641

2013

17,837

40,478

2014

25,061

65,539

2015

42,236

107,775

2016

8,030

115,805

2000s witnessed the construction of an extensive
mechanism of control. Based on the abovementioned political, social and cultural anxieties, the
number of blocked websites grew exponentially, with
93 percent of them blocked by TIB’s administrative
orders.5
These 93% of blocked websites mentioned above
were banned mainly on grounds of obscenity. They
were identified via word-based filtering methods
and comprised of content related to erotica, dating,
and/or LGBTI rights. 6 In 2011, the TIB created a
list of 138 words that included çıplak (naked), itiraf
(confession), escort, hot, anal, etc., and asked Turkish
hosting companies to ban domain names including
any of these words.7
In 2009, the TIB stopped releasing the number of
blocked websites creating a serious transparency
problem. Since then legal scholars, internet activists and
a citizen initiative called EngelliWeb (“Disabled Web”)
have been tracking the number of blocked websites.
The annual and cumulative number of blocked websites
were calculated using the Internet Archive. The numbers
pertaining to administrative orders were culled from
EngelliWeb’s own statistics. See: Internet Archive,
Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://
engelliweb.com/, (accessed November 27, 2016). Engelli
Web, ‘Kurum Bazından İstatistikler’, November 27, 2016,
https://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/, (accessed November
27, 2016).
6
Kuşburnu, ‘Türkiye’de Internet Sansürünün Son
6 Yılı’, Kame, July 9, 2015, https://network23.org/
kame/2015/07/09/turkiyede-internet-sansurunun-son-6yili/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
7
‘Turkey Forbids ‘Forbidden’ from Internet Domain
5
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In addition to websites, Turkish authorities
blocked
several
social
networking
and/or
collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace,
Dailymotion, Vimeo, Blogspot, Last.fm) because of a
single case of offending content or on the grounds
of copyright infringement. While some of these sites
were banned intermittently, YouTube remained
notoriously inaccessible between 2008 and 2010,
and continued to receive more than 30 court orders
for closure until 2014.8
Regarding the introduction of filtering systems
and the administrative decisions to ban certain
domain names, Turkish authorities were especially
concerned with the protection of children
and families. For example, the Information
and Communication Technologies Board (Bilgi
Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, known by its Turkish
acronym, BTK), the government agency responsible
for the regulation of the telecommunications
industry, launched a program dubbed the “Safe Use
of the Internet” in 2011. The BTK required all users
to install a filtering system in their computers and to
choose from four packages (child, family, domestic,
and standard). Faced with strong reaction from
academics, legal scholars and civic organizations,
the BTK modified the program to be non-mandatory
and offered two filtering options instead (child and
family).9 Although the family filter is optional for
individual users, it is mandatory for public access
sites such as internet cafes. While the BTK declines
to provide a complete list of websites blocked by the
family filter, the mandatory filtering software used
at internet cafes reportedly blocks more than 1.5
million websites.10

Names,’ Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review
(Istanbul), April 28, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n =turkey-forbids8216forbidden8217-from-internet-domainnames-2011-04-28, (accessed November 27, 2016).
8
M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, op. cit.
9
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Turkey,
September 24, 2012, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/2012/turkey, (accessed November 27,
2016).
10
Kuşburnu, ‘Türkiye’de Kaç Websitesi Sansürlü?’,
Kame, September 20, 2015, https://network23.org/
kame/2015/09/20/turkiyede-kac-websitesi-sansurlu/,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
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III. 2013-2016: Tightening the noose
Legal and technological restrictions that were
primarily driven by the urge to protect family values
and/or national unity during the 2000s began to
intensify in the following decade. Faced with two
major legitimacy crises, first the nationwide antigovernment Gezi protests in June 2013, and then
revelations about a massive corruption scandal
in December 2013, the AKP government imposed
further restrictions to combat the perceived threats
of digital communications.
During the Gezi protests, various actors resorted
to social media to organize, gather and share news,
and express underlying disenchantment with
the AKP government.11 The AKP’s response was
generally to demonize the internet and social media
platforms, as seen in Erdogan’s labeling of Twitter as
a “menace” and “a curse on societies” that harbors
“all sorts of lies.”12 There were also announcements
by government officials about imminent restrictions
to be placed on online communications to maintain
public safety and order and to prevent so-called
cyber-crimes.13
‘A Breakout Role for Twitter? The Role of Social Media
during the Turkish Protests’ Social Media and Political
Participation (SMaPP) Data Report, New York University,
June 1, 2013, https://18798-presscdn-pagely.netdna-ssl.
com/smapp/wp-content/uploads/sites/1693/2016/04/
turkey_data_report.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016).
S. Kuzuloglu, ‘Gezi Parkı Eylemlerinin Sosyal Medya
Karnesi.’ Radikal, June 19, 2013, http://www.radikal.com.
tr/yazarlar/m_serdar_kuzuloglu/gezi_parki_eylemlerinin_
sosyal_medya_karnesi-1138146, (accessed November
27, 2016). D. Ergurel, ‘The Role of Social Networks in
#OccupyGezi Protests.’ Today’s Zaman, June 2, 2013,
https://web.archive.org/web/20141018012744/http://
www.todayszaman.com/blog/deniz-ergurel/the-role-ofsocial-networks-in-occupygezi-protests_317224.html,
(accessed November 27, 2016). D. Dlugoleski, ‘We Are
All Journalists Now.’ Columbia Journalism Review, May
20, 2013, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/turkey_
counter_media.php, (accessed November 27, 2016).
12
Z. Tufekci, ‘Everyone Is Getting Turkey’s Twitter Block
Wrong.’ Medium, 2014. https://medium.com/technologyand-society/everyone-is-getting-turkeys-twitter-blockwrong-cb596ce5f27, (accessed November 27, 2016).
13
S. Ocak, ‘“Siber Suçlar” için resmi adım atıldı: SOME’ler
geliyor’ Radikal, June 20, 2013. http://www.radikal.com.
tr/turkiye/siber_suclar_icin_resim_adim_atildi_someler_
geliyor-1138417, (accessed November 27, 2016). ‘Police is
`Working on’ Twitter, Interior Minister Says’ Bianet, June
17, 2013. http://bianet.org/english/politics/147681-police11
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Approximately six months after the Gezi protests,
a massive corruption scandal broke out in December
2013 triggering the construction of a sprawling
online control regime. The scandal mostly transpired
on social media with Erdogan’s opponents sharing
transcripts and audio files of illegally wiretapped
conversations between Erdogan, his son, cabinet
ministers and pro-AKP businessmen. To curb
the flow of damning information online, the AKP
began to deploy a combination of first, second and
third generation controls by introducing stricter
legislation, banning Twitter and YouTube, surveilling
and prosecuting users, and throttling social media
platforms.
The AKP government’s approach to ICTs during
this period bears striking similarities to that of the
Russian government in the aftermath of the 201112 protest movement, also known as the White
Revolution. Having noticed the “opportunities for
political engagement and mobilization afforded by
social media,” the Russian government engaged
in a widespread crackdown. It introduced laws to
limit political engagement online, “attempted to
re-create the state through cyberspace, fostering
self-censorship and disempowering publics,” and
increased the presence of pro-government forces
online creating “distorted communication within the
Russian public sphere.”14
In what follows, we examine similar strategies of
control that took place in the Turkish online sphere
between 2013 and 2016.

1. Legislation
Shortly after the corruption scandal, the AKPdominated Parliament passed a new law amending
the provisions of the 2007 Internet Law. The new law
authorized the TIB to issue a blocking order based
on a complaint filed for breach of an individual’s
right to privacy and to do so without obtaining a
court order. Per the new law, individuals and legal
entities can directly apply to the TIB and request
the removal of offending content. The TIB can then
require the ISPs to remove the offending content
is-working-on-twitter-interior-minister-says, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
14
A. Klyueva, “Taming Online Political Engagement in
Russia: Disempowered Publics, Empowered State, and
Challenges of the Fully Functioning Society.” International
Journal of Communication, 2016, 4670.
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within 4 hours. The new law also enables a URLbased blocking system, making it possible to block
individual posts or all posts from a specific social
media user.15 If the offending website is hosted
domestically, it can be taken down by the TIB; if it is
hosted abroad, then the said content can be blocked
and filtered through ISPs.16 The new law even gave
the president of the TIB the authority to block URLs
without complaints having been filed at all. Another
controversial provision required the ISPs to collect
data on users’ activities for up to two years and to
provide authorities with this data on demand.17
In addition to passing a stricter Internet Law, the
AKP amended the Law on State Intelligence Services
and the National Intelligence Organization (Law No.
6532) to expand the surveillance of online users.
The amendment gives the National Intelligence
Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, known
by its Turkish acronym, MIT) unfettered access
to online and offline “information, documents,
data, or records from public institutions, financial
institutions, and entities with or without a legal
character.” In practice, the new law enables the MIT
to obtain citizens’ personal data from any public
or private institution (banks, schools, hospitals,
ISPs) without a court order. Moreover, the new law
criminalizes “the leaking and publication of secret
official information, punishable by a prison term
of up to nine years” and gives the AKP yet another
tool to prevent the press and online news sites from
reporting on government corruption and official
misconduct.18
Since the blocking of a specific URL on encrypted
communications (e.g. websites that start with “HTTPS”) is
technically not possible without banning the whole domain
name, the amendment included a specific provision that
enabled the ISPs to block websites in their entirety. See: E.K.
Sözeri, ‘Ban against a single blog post leads Turkish ISPs to
censor all of WordPress’, The Daily Dot, April 1, 2015 http://www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-wordpress-censorship-block/,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
16
Freedom House, Struggle for Turkey’s Internet, August
27, 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
The%20Struggle%20for%20Turkey%27s%20Internet.pdf,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
17
W. Zeldin, ‘Turkey: Law on Internet Publications
Amended’, Library of Congress, February 24, 2014.
Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/
article/turkey-law-on-internet-publications-amended/,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
18
K. Roth, ‘Turkey’s Tyrant in the Making’, Foreign Policy,
May12, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/12/
15
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2. Social media bans
To control online flows of information, the
AKP has also resorted to banning social media
platforms. Whereas the earlier bans in late 2000s
were prompted by content that allegedly threatened
national unity, family and moral values, etc., those
that have taken place since 2014 are part and
parcel of the AKP’s broader initiatives to curb the
dissemination of news and information about the
corruption scandal, foreign policy failures, Kurdish
issue and/or security crises. For example, the TIB
blocked access to Twitter in March 2014 citing a
court order based on privacy invasion complaints
that had been filed by citizens, however the ban
was actually motivated by the AKP’s need to limit
the dissemination of critical news and information
ahead of the local elections. 19 A month later, an
Istanbul court asked Twitter, YouTube and Facebook
to remove the images of a prosecutor being held at
gunpoint arguing that these images were helping to
“spread terrorist propaganda.” Facebook complied
with the court decision, removed the said images
before the deadline and averted the ban. Twitter
and YouTube remained unavailable for several
hours, but they too complied and removed the
images afterwards.20

3. Content removal
Since 2013, the AKP government has banned
social media sites promptly and without hesitation.
Yet even in the absence of specific incidents, it
pursues tight control over the flow of information
by filing content removal requests with social media
companies on a regular basis. As can be seen in
transparency reports issued by Facebook, Google
and Twitter, Turkey ranks among the top countries
with the most removal requests.21
turkeys-tyrant-in-the-making/, (accessed November 27,
2016); Freedom House, op. cit.
19
Z. Tufekci, op. cit.
20
E. Peker and S. Schechner, ‘Turkey Briefly Blocks
YouTube’, Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2015, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/turkish-court-bans-access-to-internetsites-over-hostage-crisis-content-1428325451, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
21
Google, Transparency Report: Turkey, https://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
TR/, (accessed November 27, 2016). Facebook,
Government Requests Report: Turkey, https://govtrequests.
facebook.com/country/Turkey/2015-H2/, (accessed
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Table 2: Number of content removal requests by
Turkish courts or administrative entities
Year

Google

Facebook

Twitter

2010

100

-

-

2011

443

-

-

2012

12,122

-

16

2013

13,965

2,014

32

2014

3,533

5,517

2,946

2015

4,366

6,574

10,070

2016

-

-

14,953

An important point to note here is the inclination
of these companies to comply with Turkish
authorities’ requests to avoid a total ban, loss of
users and advertising revenues in Turkey’s evergrowing digital market. For example, since March
2014 Twitter has used its “country-withheld content
policy” tool to block certain users or tweets from
being seen in Turkey.22 Facebook has repeatedly shut
down pages of Kurdish politicians and newspapers,
general interest pages about Kurdish music and
culture, and pages with pro-Kurdish content simply
based on “community complaints.”23 According to
a leaked internal guideline, Facebook prompts its
editors to block any content that allegedly insults
Ataturk or supports the Kurdish militia group PKK.24
Internet and free speech activists in Turkey
describe Twitter’s policy as hypocritical considering
its position on global free speech.25 Yaman Akdeniz, a
November 27, 2016). Twitter, Transparency Report: Turkey,
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/tr.html,
(accessed November 27, 2016). Note that Facebook does
not provide number of requests, and that Twitter’s 2016
data only covers the first half of the year.
22
V. Gadde, ‘Challenging the access ban in Turkey’,
Twitter, March 26, 2014, https://blog.twitter.com/2014/
challenging-the-access-ban-in-turkey, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
23
Freedom House, Struggle for Turkey’s Internet, August
27, 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
The%20Struggle%20for%20Turkey%27s%20Internet.pdf,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
24
S. Spary, ‘Facebook Is Embroiled in a Row with Activists
Over “Censorship”’, BuzzFeed, April 8, 2016, https://www.
buzzfeed.com/saraspary/facebook-in-dispute-with-prokurdish-activists-over-deleted (accessed November 27,
2016).
25
E.K. Sözeri, ‘Uncovering the accounts that trigger
Turkey’s war on Twitter’, The Daily Dot, January 31, 2015,

prominent activist and legal scholar notes that since
most content that is readily removed by Facebook
and Twitter is specifically about political expression,
the already-existing fears among dissidents,
activists and journalists are worsened .26 According
to members of Turkey Blocks, an independent
group that identifies and verifies reports of internet
censorship, also note that Twitter, Facebook and
Google are “on board” with Turkey’s censorship
practices because they collaborate with the
authorities and hold Turkey to different standards
in terms of content removal requests. They note
that “Especially in the post-coup period, Twitter
readily complies with Turkey’s demands” which has
“emboldened” Turkish authorities.27 		
Other enablers of government restrictions are
the domestic ISPs. In 2008, upon TIB’s request,
the ISPs agreed to install DNS servers that sync
directly with TIB’s central server facilitating the
automatic updating of list of websites to be banned
under “catalog crimes” (such as child pornography
or obscenity). 28 In 2014, the TIB expanded this
infrastructure by introducing deep packet inspection
(DPI) technologies and had the ISPs agree to maintain
detailed traffic logs of their customers. The use of DPI
also enabled the TIB and by proxy the government,
to use more opaque tools to censor online content,
such as blocking individual URL addresses instead
of banning the entire domain, wholesale banning of
news topics instead of banning news websites, and
throttling access to social media platforms instead
of nationwide bans.

http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/twitter-transparencyreport-turkey-censorship/, (accessed November 27,
2016). J. Halliday, ‘Twitter’s Tony Wang: “We are the free
speech wing of the free speech party”’, The Guardian,
March 22, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/
media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-free-speech
(accessed November 27, 2016).
26
Email correspondence with Yaman Akdeniz, 2016.
27
Skype interview with two members of Turkey Blocks,
January 2, 2017.
28 E.K. Sözeri, ‘Censorship reveals direct, likely illegal link
between ISPs and Turkey’s government’, The Daily Dot,
December 28, 2016, http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/
turkey-censorship-nos-court-orders-illegal/, (accessed
January 14, 2017), M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğ, op cit.
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4. Surveillance of users
In addition to first and second generation
controls, Turkish authorities have begun to deploy
third generation controls, such as surveillance and
hacking. For example, the Turkish National Police
used online intrusion tools and services provided
by Hacking Team, an Italian surveillance company,
between 2011 and 2014.29 Turk Telekom—the
largest ISP that owns 80% of internet infrastructure
in Turkey – has also been found to have procured
deep packet inspection tools from Procera Networks,
a U.S.-based company. 30 Turk Telekom also used to
work with Phorm, a targeted advertising company,
and deployed its deep packet inspection tools in
violation of privacy laws.31 Additionally, there are
other unspecified government clients that have
used (and/or continue to use) mass surveillance
services provided by Asoto, Netclean and Nokia
Siemens Networks.32

5. Prosecution of users
An important tool in the
arsenal to suppress critical
prosecution of social media
posts that allegedly insult

Turkish government’s
online speech is the
users based on their
the state and state

29
E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey paid Hacking Team $600k to spy on
civilians,’ The Daily Dot, July 7, 2015, http://www.dailydot.
com/politics/hacking-team-turkey/, (accessed November
27, 2016).
30
It was in July 2014 when Turk Telekom’s contract with
Procera Networks was revealed. However, Procera
released a statement noting that its activities were in
accordance with the new Internet Law and the specific
provision that required ISPs to store users’ activity logs
for two years. See W. Zeldin, op. cit., T. Fox-Brewster,
‘Is An American Company’s Technology Helping Turkey
Spy On Its Citizens?’, Forbes, October 25, 2016, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/10/25/
procera-francisco-partners-turkey-surveillance-erdogan/,
(accessed November 27, 2016). S. Güçlü, ‘Türk Telekom’a
5 Yıl Önce Verilen Fiber Muafiyet Hakkı İşe Yaradı mı?’,
Türk İnternet, November 7, 2016, http://www.turkinternet.com/portal/yazigoster.php?yaziid=54478,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
31
E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkish government revealed to be spying
on its citizens through ISPs’, The Daily Dot, October 29,
2016, www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-procera-deal-ispsdpi/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
32
Privacy International, Surveillance Industry Index, https://
sii.transparencytoolkit.org/search?action=index&contr
oller=docs&found_in_facet=Turkey&page=1, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
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officials and disseminate propaganda for terrorist
organizations. According to the Penal Code,
insulting state officials is punishable by a prison
sentence of one or two years, whereas insulting
the president (i.e. Erdogan) can lead to a prison
sentence of up to four years (Article 125/3a and
Article 299).33 The Ministry of Justice statistics show
that 1,953 individuals were prosecuted in 2015 on
charges of insulting Erdogan, and 49 on charges of
insulting state officials.34 According to news reports,
34 of these cases involved social media posts by
members of opposition parties, lawyers, academics,
journalists, and members of NGOs.35 Four users
were handed 10-month prison sentences each;
three placed under judicial control, and fourteen
arrested pending trial. The rest were detained
pending prosecution or summoned for questioning.
Among the high-profile cases are an anchorwoman,
a former editor-in-chief, and a columnist who were
prosecuted for allegedly critical tweets concerning
Erdogan, the state or state officials. 36
In addition, state institutions and private
companies have begun to take legal action against
Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Penal Code
of Turkey (Law 5237, September 26, 2004), Opinion No.
831/2015, February 15, 2016. http://www.venice.coe.
int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2016)011-e,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
34
Turkish Ministry of Justice, Ceza Mahkemelerinde
TCK Uyarınca Yıl İçinde Açılan Davalardaki Suç ve Sanık
Sayıları (2015) (Distribution of court cases by Penal
Code articles (2015), http://www.adlisicil.adalet.gov.tr/
Istatistikler/1996/genel_tck_açılan2015.pdf, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
35
B. Molu and D. Irak, ‘TCK md. 299 - Cumhurbaşkanına
Hakaret Suçu kapsamında ifadeye çağrılan, gözaltına
alınan, soruşturma açılan, tutuklanan kişilerin güncel
listesi’, April 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/tck_299, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
36
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkish editor given
suspended prison term for insulting Erdoğan on Twitter’,
June 19, 2015, https://cpj.org/2015/06/turkish-editorgiven-suspended-prison-term-for-in.php, (accessed
November 27, 2016). E.K. Sözeri, ‘Dutch journalist
arrested in Turkey for ‘insulting’ President Erdoğan
online’, The Daily Dot, Apr 26, 2016, http://www.dailydot.
com/layer8/ebru-umar-insult-erdogan-twitter/, (accessed
November 27, 2016). ‘Turkish court acquits journalist
over corruption case tweet’, AFP, October 6, 2015, https://
uk.news.yahoo.com/turkish-court-acquits-journalistover-corruption-case-tweet-093039669.html, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
33
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social media users, exploiting Turkey’s vaguelydefined defamation laws. In 2015, the state-run
news agency, Anadolu Ajansı, sued more than fifty
artists and journalists on charges of libel.37 In 2016,
Turkcell, one of Turkey’s largest mobile network
providers, sought 10,000 Turkish liras (USD 3,500)
in damages from each Twitter user that tweeted
the hashtag #TecavuzCell (“Rape Cell”) as a means
of protesting the company’s sponsorship of a
government-linked foundation embroiled in child
abuse allegations.38
In addition to defamation charges, in 2015
Turkish authorities have accused more than
13,000 individuals with “disseminating terrorist
propaganda” in relation to expression of political
opinions or coverage of the Kurdish conflict.39
That same year, 36 journalists and newspaper
distributors were imprisoned on charges of terrorist
propaganda.40 Although official statements did not
specify how many of these cases involve social media
posts, 41 news reports stated that Kurdish journalists
E. Önderoğlu, ‘Erdoğan’ı Eleştiren Kendini Mahkemede
Buluyor; İşte Davalar!’, Bianet, April 30, 2015, https://
bianet.org/bianet/medya/164185-erdogan-i-elestirenkendini-mahkemede-buluyor-iste-davalar, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
38
E.K. Sözeri, ‘A Turkish mobile provider got 13 court
orders to erase this hashtag from the Internet’, The
Daily Dot, May 20, 2016, http://www.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkcell-tecavucell-twitter-censorship/, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
39
The Anti-Terror Law stipulates that “any person making
propaganda for a terrorist organization [by justifying,
glorifying or inciting violent or threatening acts] shall be
punished with imprisonment from one to five years. If
this crime is committed through means of mass media,
the penalty shall be aggravated by one half.” (Article 7).
Legislationline, Law on Fight Against Terrorism (Law 3713,
April 12, 1991), http://www.legislationline.org/download/
action/download/id/3727/file/Turkey_anti_terr_1991_
am2010_en.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016), Turkish
Ministry of Justice, Ceza Mahkemelerinde Özel Kanunlar
Uyarinca Yıl İçinde Açilan Davalardaki Suç Ve Sanik Sayiları
(2015) (“Distribution of court cases by Special Codes
articles (2015)”), 2015, http://www.adlisicil.adalet.gov.tr/
Istatistikler/1996/genel_%C3%B6zel_a%C3%A7%C4%B1la
n2015.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2016).
40
E. Önderoğlu, ‘2015 Medya: Gazetecilik Tehlikeli
ve Sakıncalı Bir Meslek!’, Bianet, January 29, 2016,
https://bianet.org/bianet/medya/171582-2015-medyagazetecilik-tehlikeli-ve-sakincali-bir-meslek, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
41
During the pre-coup period, Turkish officials refrained
37
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Idris Yılmaz and Vildan Atmaca were prosecuted
for their pro-PKK Facebook pages, while Hayri Tunc
was held in pre-trial detention for his Twitter and
Facebook posts, and Hamza Aktan was detained for
retweeting a BBC post regarding military operations
in Southeast Turkey. 42

6. Throttling and DNS poisoning
During the 2013-2016 period, the AKP government
began to use new tools to limit the flow of news
and information in the online public sphere. The
first is bandwidth throttling, the intentional slowing
down of internet service at the ISP level. According
to Turkey Blocks, there have been at least seven
cases of throttling since 2015.43 As seen in the table
below, the AKP government blocked URLs (including
news sites) and throttled social media platforms at
times of major political events and security crises to
suppress critical reporting and to prevent citizens
from mobilizing.44
from openly referring to social media posts as evidence
of “terrorist propaganda.” In the post-coup period,
however, officials have made explicit references to social
media posts and stated that these posts can potentially
be used as evidence in investigations.
42
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkish journalist
arrested for posts on social media’, February 8, 2016,
https://cpj.org/2016/02/turkish-journalist-arrestedfor-posts-on-social-me.php, (accessed November 27,
2016), Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘In Turkey, two
journalists accused of creating terrorist propaganda
with social media posts’, November 18, 2015, https://
cpj.org/2015/11/in-turkey-two-journalists-accusedof-terrorism-ove.php, (accessed November 27, 2016),
‘Turkey detains pro-Kurdish news editor over tweets’,
AFP, April 30, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/turkeydetains-pro-kurdish-news-editor-over-tweets-002818986.
html, (accessed November 27, 2016).
43
I. Mater, ‘TIB’siz Türkiye’, Bianet, August 27, 2016,
http://bianet.org/biamag/biamag/177985-tib-siz-turkiye,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
44
This table is based on information presented in
Freedom House’s “2016 Freedom of the Net: Turkey” and
Turkey Blocks reports. Note that on July 15, 2016, the
night of the coup attempt, social media was throttled as
is generally the case, however this decision was promptly
overturned in order to disseminate President Erdoğan’s
call to his supporters to take to the streets and resist the
putschist soldiers. See: E.K. Sözeri, ‘Why Turkey issued a
social media ban during a coup attempt—and promptly
lifted it’, The Daily Dot, July 17, 2016, www.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkey-coup-social-media-ban-lift/ (accessed
November 27, 2016).
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Table 3: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the pre-coup period
Date

Incident

April 3, 2015

Istanbul prosecutor taken hostage 166 URLs blocked including news articles, and
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube content

July 20, 2015

Bomb attack in Suruç

173 URLs blocked including 38 news websites

October 10, 2015

Bomb attack in Ankara

Facebook and Twitter throttled

January 12, 2016

Bomb attack in Istanbul

Government issued media blackout

February 17, 2016

Bomb attack in Ankara

Facebook and Twitter throttled

March 13, 2016

Bomb attack in Ankara

Facebook and Twitter throttled, 214 URLs
blocked

March 19, 2016

Bomb attack in Istanbul

Facebook and Twitter banned for 24 hours

June 28, 2016

Bomb attack at Istanbul airport

Facebook and Twitter throttled

July 15, 2016

Military coup attempt

Facebook and Twitter briefly throttled

The second tool deployed by Turkish authorities
is DNS poisoning, a form of hacking or blocking
social media sites by surreptitiously redirecting
users to incorrect IP addresses. In March 2014, Turk
Telekom hijacked Google DNS servers, which the
Internet Society described as a “man-in-the-middle”
(MiTM) attack” performed to “comply with [the]
government’s banning of [Twitter and YouTube]”
by “giving users false information.”45 Not only were
users blocked from their intended destination, but
also the “IP addresses of [their] devices attempting
to reach the two services using foreign DNS servers”
were also logged by the government.46

45
D. York, ‘Turkish Hijacking of DNS Providers Shows
Clear Need For Deploying BGP And DNS Security’,
Internet Society, April 1, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.
org/deploy360/blog/2014/04/turkish-hijacking-of-dnsproviders-shows-clear-need-for-deploying-bgp-and-dnssecurity/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
46
S. Gallagher, ‘Turkey now blocking social media by
hijacking Google DNS’, Ars Technica, March 30, 2014,
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/03/
turkey-now-blocking-social-media-by-hijacking-googledns/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
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IV. July 2016-present: Post-coup
developments
As shown above, the AKP constructed a sprawling
surveillance-control-censorship regime during
2013-2016 mainly in response to the political fallout
from Gezi protests and the corruption scandal as
well as security-related incidents such as terrorist
attacks. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the
AKP’s internet policy was similarly shaped by
political anxieties which ultimately expanded and
fortified the existing online control regime.
In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup,
the AKP government under the leadership of
President Erdogan declared a State of Emergency,
and embarked on a massive purge of security
officers, civil servants, educational and media
workers it accused of being affiliated with the
religious movement of Fethullah Gulen— the alleged
mastermind of the coup. Given the severity of the
potential threats the coup would have caused had it
succeeded, a “national consensus” emerged, uniting
the AKP, opposition parties and various political
actors and engendering the (false) belief that the
State of Emergency would be used only to root out
the coup planners. However, it soon became clear
that Erdogan and his government would deploy the
SoE to repress other perceived enemies, especially
the Kurds, to consolidate their hegemony and stifle
any remaining opposition—both online and offline.
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In what follows, we focus on measures taken by the
AKP in the post-coup period and their implications
on online communications.

1. Legislation via decree laws
One of the unchecked powers granted by the
State of Emergency is the ability to rule by decree.
Since the coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP
government passed fifteen decree laws (as of this
writing) that enabled the reconfiguration of political,
economic, social and cultural fields as per Erdogan’s
political priorities. Including, but not limited to the
massive purge of tens of thousands of civil servants
without due process, closure of hundreds of print
and broadcast outlets, arrests of journalists, writers
and members of the parliament, decree laws have
also been deployed to impose further restrictions
on the rapidly-deteriorating digital public sphere.
The passing and application of decree laws are
supposedly limited to coup-related matters, however
in practice they have resulted in digital surveillance
of users and the shutting down of internet service
at times of so-called security operations (see
below). For example, Decree Law 670 enables the
interception of digital communications of all users
as part of the coup-related investigations and the
collection of private data from all state institutions
and private companies. Decree Law 671 amends
the Law of Digital Communications and allows
the BTK to overtake any privately-held digital
communications company including cable or cellular
network providers to “[maintain] national security
and public order; prevent crime; protect public
health and public morals; or protect the rights and
freedoms [of citizens].”47 Last but not least, and in
a blow to personal privacy online, Decree Law 680
amends the Code of Police Conduct and enables the
Department of Cybercrimes to gather and intercept
internet traffic on any cyber-related investigation,
and to obtain personal information from ISPs
without a court order.

E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey uses emergency decree to shut
down internet on 11 Kurdish cities to “prevent protests”’,
The Daily Dot, October 27, 2016, http://www.dailydot.
com/layer8/turkey-cuts-kurdistan-internet/, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
47
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2. Closing of the TIB
One of the significant developments in the
aftermath of the coup attempt was the closing of the
TIB by decree law. Claiming that the agency had been
infiltrated by Gulenists and served as a hub of illegal
wiretapping over the years, the AKP government
transferred the TIB’s duties and responsibilities
to the BTK. However, the closing of the agency
responsible for the blocking of more than 100,000
websites and banning of social media platforms
on various occasions is not necessarily good
news for internet users, activists and digital rights
lawyers in the country. As Yaman Akdeniz notes,
the BTK is driven by the same “aggressive blocking
mentality” as the TIB was. Akdeniz also underlines
the partisan character of the BTK since it operates
under the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs
and Communications, and its staff are government
appointees.48

3. Throttling
In the post-coup period, the AKP government
has continued to use throttling as a measure to
restrict certain types of content. As table 4 shows,
social media platforms and on certain occasions
private messaging applications are throttled to limit
online communications in the aftermath of terrorist
attacks, security and military-related incidents.

4. Internet Shutdowns and Cloud/VPN Restrictions

During the post-coup period, the AKP not only
escalated the implementation of its customary
strategies (i.e implementation of legal restrictions,
throttling, prosecution of online users), but also
deployed internet shutdowns, cloud and VPN
restrictions—drastic forms of control that are
generally associated with dictatorships.
First came the internet shutdown in September
2016 as elected mayors in predominantly-Kurdish
cities were physically removed from their posts
48
‘Social media blocked in Turkey’, Turkey Blocks, August
25, 2016, https://turkeyblocks.org/2016/08/25/socialmedia-blocked-turkey/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
‘Elektronik Haberleşme Sektörüne İlişkin Yetkilendirme
Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik’,
(“Amendment to the Authorization Regulation in the
Digital Communications Sector”) Resmi Gazete, http://
www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/06/20160611-1.
htm, (accessed November 27, 2016).
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Table 4: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the post-coup period
Date

Incident

Content restriction

August 20, 2016

Bomb attack in Gaziantep

Facebook and Twitter throttled for six hours

August 25, 2016

Unknown reason

Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled for seven
hours

September 11, 2016

28 elected mayors removed Landline and mobile internet access cut for 15 cities,
from office in the Kurdishfor approximately 12 million citizens
majority Southeast

October 7, 2016

Unknown reason

Twitter intermittently throttled

October 8, 2016

Email archive of Energy
Minister leaked

Google Drive, Drobox, One Drive and GitHub blocked

October 26-31, 2016

Co-mayors of Diyarbakir
(Kurdish-majority city)
detained

Landline and mobile internet access intermittently cut
for 11 cities in southeast region

November 4, 2016

Pro-Kurdish party (HDP)
co-chairs and deputies
detained

Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and WhatsApp throttled

November 4, 2016

Unknown reason

Access to popular VPN services banned permanently

December 3, 2016

Unknown reason

Wikipedia temporarily throttled

December 18, 2016

Unknown reason

Access to Tor Network banned permanently

December 19, 2016

Assassination of Russian
Ambassador to Turkey

Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled; Dutch
broadcaster NOS banned

December 22, 2016

Release of ISIS video on
Turkish soldiers’ execution

Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled

January 1,2017

Armed attack at Istanbul
nightclub

Temporary gag order including social media and news
websites (no throttling)

under the State of Emergency rulings. The AKP
government via the BTK shut down internet service
in ten cities to suppress the dissemination of news
and information regarding possible civil unrest in
the region. According to Turkey Blocks, internet
access through landline and mobile telephony
was unavailable for about 4-6 hours, affecting
approximately 12 million people. This very first
internet shutdown, albeit regional, was repeated
in October 2016 when the co-mayors of Diyarbakir,
the de facto capital of the Kurdish community,
were arrested on charges of terrorism. This second
shutdown affected approximately six million people
in 11 cities in the southeast, and lasted two days (in
Diyarbakir, the duration was five days).49 As Rebecca
49
‘New internet shutdown in Turkey’s Southeast:
8% of country now offline amidst Diyarbakir unrest’,
Turkey Blocks, October 27, 2016, https://turkeyblocks.
org/2016/10/27/new-internet-shutdown-turkeysoutheast-offline-diyarbakir-unrest/, (accessed
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MacKinnon notes “localized disconnection and
restriction” is a tool used by governments to “ensure
that people cannot use the internet or mobile
phones to organize protests” in times of crisis.50
On November 4, the crackdown on Kurdish
politicians, as 11 members of the parliament from
the Peoples’ Democratic Party (known by its Turkish
acronym, HDP) were arrested in midnight house
raids. Instead of a regional internet shutdown, the
government implemented a nationwide throttling of
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, as well as WhatsApp (the
first time an instant messaging service was restricted)
justifying it as a “temporary security measure.”51 The
November 27, 2016).
50
R. MacKinnon, 2011. “China’s ‘Networked
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 22:2, p. 40
51
‘Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp shutdown
in Turkey’, Turkey Blocks, November 4, 2016, https://
turkeyblocks.org/2016/11/04/social-media-shutdownturkey/, (accessed November 27, 2016). ‘Slowdown in
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throttling of social media and instant messaging
services was indeed temporary, however the BTK
ordered Turkish ISPs to block popular VPN services
and Tor Network to enable the full implementation
of throttling and banning orders.52 Experts note that
the decision to block Tor access will most likely be
permanent as part of the government’s broader
plan to not only execute censorship orders but also
to enable easier surveillance of users.53
Considering the above-mentioned developments,
it is fair to argue that the Turkish government’s
post-coup internet policy is different from the precoup period in terms of both the types of measures
(e.g. regional internet shutdowns) and the types of
incidents that trigger these measures. For example,
the blocking of online communications that occurred
in July 2015 was prompted by a cross-border military
operation in Southeast Turkey,54 whereas those in
September-November 2016 were specifically aimed
at limiting (potential) civilian protests in the same
region. Likewise, social media throttling in the precoup period transpired at times of security-related
incidents (see Table 3), whereas in the post-coup
period it was prompted by the leaking of damaging
emails and information, and was complemented
with the blocking of cloud drive services, VPN
services and Tor access. This widening of the net
access to social media in Turkey a ‘security measure,’
says PM’, Hurriyet Daily News, November 4, 2016, http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/problems-in-access-tosocial-media-in-turkey-a-security-measure-says-pm.asp
x?pageID=238&nID=105744&NewsCatID=509, (accessed
November 27, 2016).
52
L. Franceschi-Bicchierai, ‘Turkey Doubles Down on
Censorship With Block on VPNs, Tor’, Motherboard,
November 4, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/read/
turkey-doubles-down-on-censorship-with-block-on-vpnstor, (accessed November 27, 2016).
53
J. Kopstein, ‘Tor Ban in Turkey Likely Permanent,
Watchdog Group Says’, Vocativ, January 03, 2017 www.
vocativ.com/389232/tor-ban-turkey-permanent/,
(accessed January 14, 2017).
54
In July 2015, mobile internet access was cut in most
of southeast Turkey for 60 hours during the aerial
bombardment of ISIS and PKK positions in Northern
Syria and Iraq. According to local news reports, the
service interruption was based on an order issued by
the Office of the Prime Minister. See, E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey
cuts internet access to Kurdish towns, removes elected
mayors’, The Daily Dot, September 11, 2016, www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-internet-access-kurdishtowns/ (accessed January 14, 2017).
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and tightening of the mesh, so to speak, occurred in
October 2016 when the government blocked access
to drive services (Google Drive, DropBox, Microsoft
One Drive) and the software repository GitHub
in response to the leaking of the email archive of
Berak Albayrak, the Minister of Energy and Natural
Sources, and Erdogan’s son-in-law. The decision to
block said services was prompted by the publication
of 57,000 emails that laid bare the relationships
between the AKP, and business and media circles, as
well as details about Albayrak’s private life. 55

5. Internet sovereignty and data localization
initiatives
Another step Turkish authorities have taken in
the post-coup period is the building of “a domestic
search engine and email service compatible
with national culture and values.” Similar to Russian,
Chinese and Iranian efforts at creating digital
borders and launching country-specific social media
platforms (China’s WeChat and Russia’s VKontakte),56
the key objective of internet sovereignty is to
control the flow of information that emanates
from outside Turkey. In addition to online traffic
control, Turkish authorities are also motivated by
enhanced surveillance of online communications,
as seen in the official statement pointing to the
“need to store user data within Turkey’s borders and
ensure that communications could be fully analyzed
domestically.”57
To incentivize the establishment of local data
centers, the government will provide favorable
terms in regard to land use, corporate taxes and
electricity costs. According to Decree Law No. 678,
published in the official gazette in November 2016,
the government’s plan is to encourage Google,
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to establish data
centers in Turkey and consequently make them
‘Turkey blocks web drives after email leak’, BBC,
October 10, www.bbc.com/news/technology-37608553,
(accessed November 27, 2016).
56
S. Gunitsky, 2015. “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons:
Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives
on Politics, 13:1, p. 44
57
‘Turkey to launch domestic Google, Gmail replacements
aligned with local culture and values’, Turkey Blocks,
January 6, 2017, https://turkeyblocks.org/2017/01/06/
turkey-building-domestic-search-engine-and-email/,
(accessed January 14, 2016).
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subject to local laws. According to reports in progovernment newspapers, data localization is part
of a broader plan to store user data in order to
“accelerate the process of identifying social media
users that praise and provoke terrorism, closing
their accounts, and blocking content.”58 As members
of Turkey Blocks note, these initiatives signal a trend
towards a “walled garden” model that denies access
to foreign internet services and instead encourages
local search engines and social media platforms,
and is therefore isolationist in nature.59

6. Prosecution of social media users and the
institutionalization of “snitching”
The prosecution of social media users is not a
new phenomenon, however, in the post-coup period
it has escalated both in terms of its pervasiveness
and severity. According to the Ministry of Interior
Affairs, 3,710 people were detained for questioning
between July and December 2016 with 1,656 of them
arrested, 1,970 released, and 84 under detention
as of this writing. Charges included “inciting the
public to hatred, animosity and agitation,” “praising
terrorism,” “engaging in terrorist propaganda,”
“insulting state officials” and “undermining state
sovereignty and public safety.”60 In addition, as per
the statement of a member of the parliamentary
commission on security and intelligence affairs,
the government purportedly set up a “Social Media
Monitoring Unit” which is currently in the process
of preparing legal investigation notices for 17,000
users and finding the addresses of another 45,000.
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Shortly after the release of this information, a highprofile incident of social media-related prosecution
occurred. Barbaros Sansal, fashion designer, LGBT
activist and outspoken government critic became
the target of pro-government trolls upon sharing
a video message that included allegedly offensive
remarks concerning the AKP, the Turkish state and
society. Sansal was immediately extradited from
Northern Cyprus to Turkey, only to be physically
assaulted by angry mobs at the airport apron, and
finally detained and arrested the next day.62
While online trolling played a role in bringing
Sansal to the attention of law enforcement and the
courts, there is no publicly available information as to
how many of the above-mentioned detentions and
arrests were initiated by police surveillance versus
citizen informants. In a worrisome development, in
December 2016 the Turkish National Police (TNP)
launched a smart phone app and a dedicated
webpage that allow citizens to report social media
posts they consider to be terrorist propaganda. In its
public announcements, the TNP has urged citizens
to share all available information concerning the
harmful content, the user, and to take a screen shot
of the content in case it is deleted.63 The news of
the app was welcomed by pro-government media
outlets, journalists, pundits, and online users, who
wholeheartedly encouraged fellow citizens to report
the alleged “social media terrorists;” becoming a
symbolizing indicator of the government’s changing
internet policy and the ways it is implemented.
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geliyor, Sabah, January 4 2017, http://www.sabah.com.
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Figure 1: Message from Turkish National Police
issued in July 2016: “Turkish National Police
Warns Citizens: You can report social media
profiles and pages that support terrorist activities
and include criminal content by sending an
email to the following accounts with links and
screenshots.”64
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7. Pro-government presence online
Previous sections have documented various
types of online restrictions that range from throttling
to prosecution of users. Although the majority of
these restrictions are not formally acknowledged or
announced, they are nonetheless based on official
decisions made by the government and carried out
by the BTK and the courts. However, as this section
details, there has been a palpable increase in progovernment presence online and consequently
higher levels of intimidation and harassment against
anti-AKP journalists, pundits and users.

a) Trolls

Figure 2: Tweet posted by A Haber, a progovernment television channel: “Report the
terrorists to authorities by using your cellphone.
New app from the police. ‘Online reporting’”65

64
T.C. Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel
Müdürlüğü (Republic of Turkey Office of the Prime
Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information),
‘Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü vatandaşları uyarıyor.’ @
Byegm on Twitter, July 17, 2016, https://twitter.com/
byegm/status/754682443458895872, (accessed January
14, 2017).
65
‘Teröristi cep telefonundan ihbar et!.. Emniyetten
yeni uygulama “online ihbar” http://www.ahaber.com.

In the immediate aftermath of the Gezi protests
in 2013, the AKP government became aware of
the protestors’ use of Twitter in mobilization and
organization, and thus decided to form its own
social media team. The initial objective of the
6,000-member team, comprised of anonymous progovernment influencers, was to promote a positive
image of the government. However, this team soon
came to be known as “AK Trolls” because their online
activities turned abusive, harassing and threatening
critical journalists. 66 In 2015, their online affiliations
with government officials and pro-government
journalists were revealed, as were their attempts at
organizing physical attacks targeting independent
news organizations and journalists.67
tr/webtv/teknoloji/teroristi-cep-telefonundan-ihbar-’, @
tvahaber on Twitter, December 18, 2016, https://twitter.
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January 14, 2017), E. Kizilkaya, ‘AKP’s social media
wars’, Al-Monitor, November 15, 2013, www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2013/11/akp-social-media-twitterfacebook.html, (accessed January 14, 2017).
67
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The Daily Dot, October 22, 2015, whttp://ww.dailydot.com/
layer8/turkey-twitter-trolls/, (accessed January 14, 2017),
C. Yeginsu, ‘Opposition Journalists Under Assault in
Turkey’, The New York Times, September 17, 2015, https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/europe/oppositionjournalists-in-turkey-increasingly-face-violent-attacks.
html, (accessed January 14, 2017), E.K. Sözeri, ‘Dutch
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Erdoğan online’, The Daily Dot, April 26, 2016, http://www.
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As documented by the International Press Institute
(IPI), “government supporters and nationalists” were
already using “threats of violence, verbal abuse,
technical interference and legal threats” well before
the coup attempt to either incite physical acts of
violence against journalists or to simply “question
their credibility or to silence them.” On Twitter, it
was common practice for pro-AKP accounts to label
journalists as “traitors”, “terrorists,” “supporters of
terrorism” and “kafir” (infidel).68 The IPI notes that
in the post-coup conjuncture, the Turkish National
Police’s social media reporting program, coupled
with the ongoing State of Emergency, has only
strengthened government supporters’ harassment
of journalists and granted them continuing
impunity.69
In addition to online harassment, the pro-AKP
social media teams launched an online propaganda
scheme aiming to boost the morale of young (male)
Turks while intimidating Kurds in response to the
flaring up of armed conflict between the Turkish
dailydot.com/layer8/ebru-umar-insult-erdogan-twitter/,
(accessed January 14, 2017).
68
IPI, 2017, “On the Line: Tracking Online Harassment
of Journalists,” http://onthelinedb.ipi.media/, (accessed
January 12, 2017).
69
IPI, op. cit.
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army and the PKK. Opening new accounts under
pseudonyms such as “special force” and using the
Turkish flag in their profile pictures, these progovernment trolls shared images of dead bodies,
purportedly of Kurdish militia, emblazoning them
with nationalist slogans.70 It was later revealed that
one such Twitter account was owned by none other
than an AKP-affiliated governor in the region.71 By
the time “anti-terror” operations concluded and
the government declared that the region had been
cleansed of terrorists, all such Twitter accounts were
curiously shut down.
To illustrate the pro-government presence online,
we conducted an analysis of Twitter activity in the
months before and after the coup attempt. Based
on information collected by the DMI-TCAT,72 the
following graphs show Twitter activity by different
user groups.
E.K. Sözeri, ‘The rotten politics infecting Turkey’s
social media’, The Daily Dot, March 30, 2016, http://www.
dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-social-media-yeni-safakfacebook-twitter-manipulation/, (accessed January 4,
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Graph 1: Pro-government accounts engaged in communication, propaganda campaigns

Graph 2: Pro-government trolls

Graph 3: Pro-government journalists
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Graph 4: Human rights activists

Graph 5: Independent journalists

Graph 6: Foreign journalists based in Turkey
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Graph 7: Gulen-affiliated journalists

Graph 8: Pro-HDP accounts

Graph 9: Random users
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As seen above, the coup attempt of July 15,
2016 is certainly the most significant incident in the
period we analyzed, prompting a strong reaction
amongst almost all Turkey-based Twitter users, but
especially pro-government trolls (Graph 2) and progovernment journalists (Graph 3). The top-tweeted
incidents by pro-government communication and
propaganda accounts, on the other hand, include
the ouster of Prime Minister Davutoglu (May 5,
2016), PKK attacks (August 18, 2016), and the
beginning of Turkish military operations in Syria
(August 24, 2016) (Graph 1). This is because these
accounts were carrying out communication and
mobilization campaigns to garner popular support
for Erdogan and his government’s policies regarding
these political, security- and military-related
developments.
Pro-government trolls were most concerned with
the coup attempt, Erdogan’s massive rally (on August
8), PKK attacks, military operations in Syria, and the
arrests of Kurdish deputies (in November) (Graph 2),
whereas pro-government journalists tweeted most
about the coup attempt and the arrests of Kurdish
deputies (Graph 3).
Due to Twitter’s limitations on data collection,
the pre-coup period is under- represented for
other groups analyzed for this research. However,
activities of other groups during the post-coup
period nonetheless give us some insights into
the events they tweeted about. Independent
journalists, for example were interested in sharing
information about various developments, but most
importantly the coup attempt, PKK attacks, closure
of independent media outlets, and crackdown on
Kurdish politicians (Graph 5). Likewise, foreign
journalists based in Turkey tweeted most about
the coup attempt and arrests of Kurdish politicians
(Graph 6). Human rights activists’ and pro-HDP
accounts were most concerned with the arrests of
Kurdish deputies (Graph 4).
Another important insight provided by this
analysis is the overwhelming presence of progovernment users, be it communication and
propaganda accounts, partisan journalists or trolls.
Comparing the number of tweets posted by various
groups, one can observe that pro-government users
are the top tweeters regardless of the event in
question. Obviously, their objective is to “overwhelm
[their] adversaries” with too much information, and
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to “mobilize their supporters and bind them to the
state.”73
Finally, a curious finding is related to the spike
in tweets posted by pro-government users in
relation to the U.S presidential election.74 Soon after
Donald Trump was elected, Turkish social media
was suddenly flooded with fake news concerning an
alleged pedophilia scandal that involved the Clinton
campaign.75 Known as Pizzagate” and originally
promulgated by Trump supporters in the U.S, this
non-scandal proved to be popular amongst proAKP users for a couple of reasons. For example,
the AKP supporters sought to dilute the ongoing
debate in Turkey concerning a draft bill that would
decrease sexual assault sentences, drown out critics’
concerns about “child brides,”76 and hoped to divert
attention from the closure of an NGO that focuses
on children’s rights.77

b) The Pelikan network
In May 2016, a curious blog post, titled the
“Pelikan Dosyasi” (in a reference to the Hollywood
movie Pelican Brief) made headlines in Turkish media
E.T. Brooking and P.W. Singer, “War Goes Viral: How
Social Media is Being Weaponized.” The Atlantic, Novemer
2016, p. 79
74
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medyası, İslamofobik Trump’ı nasıl ve neden destekledi’,
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thanks to its unabashed criticism of the then Prime
Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.78 Penned by a journalist
close to Erdogan, the post exposed the ongoing
power struggle between the two men. Shortly after
the publication of the Pelican Brief, Davutoglu
resigned and an Erdogan-loyalist ascended to the
premiership. In addition to the intra-party struggles,
the blog post also revealed the existence of a
network of pro-Erdogan operatives on Twitter— one
that is separate from the larger cadre of AK Trolls.
Based on the leaked emails of Energy Minister
Berat Albayrak, researchers were able to disclose
the connections between these operatives, a progovernment columnist and a partisan think-tank,
Bosphorus Global.79 This newly-discovered network
of online operatives were found to be running
various public communication and information
projects via 23 different Twitter accounts, and
associated Facebook pages and websites. Most of
these projects involved some sort of fact-checking
service in several languages that aimed to correct
critical coverage of the AKP government found in
international media. They also targeted certain
journalists and media outlets by “name and shame”
tactics, as can be seen in following examples.80

M. Akyol, ‘How mysterious new Turkish blog exposed
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al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-riftbetween-erdogan-davutoglu.html
79
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Figure 3: @gununyalanlari, a government-linked
fact-checking service claims that an article that
apeared in Politico is “a lie.”81

Figure 4: @FactCheckingTR, the English version
of the government-linked fact-checking service
makes a similar claim82
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April 7, 2016, https://twitter.com/gununyalanlari/
status/718166702945472513, (accessed January 14,
2017).
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Figure 5: @FactCheckTR_AR, the Arabic version
of the government-linked fact-checking service
claims the Politico article in question is “a lie”83
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soldiers were burned alive began to circulate on
social media. The AKP government questioned
the veracity of the video and prohibited media
outlets from reporting even its existence. However,
Nissenbaum had shared a screenshot of the video
in a tweet and was soon targeted by a member of
the Pelikan network. This pro-government operative
reported Nissenbaum to the Turkish National Police
demanding his “immediate deportation.”84 A week
later, Nissenbaum was detained for three days
without access to lawyers. Upon his release, he left
Istanbul on his own volition.85

c) Bots

One might argue that these Pelikan-affiliated factchecking services are doing what any government
would naturally do, that is communicating its own
version of the events. However, in Turkey, these progovernment operatives who run these social media
accounts and the so-called fact-checking services
are not merely trying to set the record straight. They
are also aiming to harass and intimidate journalists
as seen in the detention of Dion Nissenbaum,
Wall Street Journal’s Turkey correspondent. In
December 2016, an ISIS video in which two Turkish
http://factcheckingturkey.com/refugees/claim-ak-partygovernment-houses-refugees-opposition-towns-194 @
POLITICOEurope @AlevScott’, @FactCheckingTR on Twitter,
April 6, 2016, https://twitter.com/FactCheckingTR/
status/717709319312183296, (accessed January 14,
2017).
83
« ءاعدا: ندملا يف نيئجاللا ُنِكْسُت ةيمنتلاو ةلادعلا بزح ةموكح
 ةضراعملاhttp://factcheckingturkey.com/ar/refugees/224
@AlevScott POLITICOEurope», @FactCheckTR_AR on
Twitter, April 29, https://twitter.com/FactCheckTR_AR/
status/726065932242657280, (accessed January 14,
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The flooding of the Turkish Twittersphere with
pro-government messages to push away dissidents
also relies on the use of bots. According to Norton,
Turkey has the highest bot population in the EMEA
region (Europe, Middle East, Africa) with Istanbul
and Ankara as cities with highest levels of bot
infestation. In terms of bot density, Turkey ranks
fifth with one bot per every 1,139 internet users.86
Norton’s data does not specify the percentage
of bots that are linked to the AKP, however, in
2014 two researchers discovered 18,000 bots that
were tweeting pro-AKP messages during the local
election campaign.87 Pro-government accounts have
used bots on other occasions as well, such as after
bombing attacks,88 primarily to drown out critical
users from online conversations and to push pro‘Wall Street Journal’ın temsilcisi katliam görseli
RT’liyor. Türkiye’deyse derhal sınırdışı edilmeli!!’ @
DionNissenbaum @EmniyetGM, @Filiz_Gunduz on Twitter,
December 22, 2016, https://twitter.com/Filiz_Gunduz/
status/812043102588456960, (accessed January 14,
2017).
85
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government hashtags to the top of Trending Topic
lists.89

d) White hat hackers
In January 2017, the BTK announced that it would
set up an “army” of white hat hackers to safeguard
Turkey from cyberattacks, and organized an online
contest to select qualified candidates.90 Although
the TIB established the National Intervention
Center against Cyber Attacks (known by its
Turkish acronym USOM) in 2014 and the Ministry
89
J. de Medeiros, ‘Turkey’s Twitter-Bot army and the
Politics of Social Media‘ entwickler.de, Juen 30, 2014,
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(accessed January 19, 2017)
90
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com/turkey/2017/01/14/white-hat-hackers-team-todefend-turkey (accessed January 19, 2017)
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of Telecommunications already employs 372
“cyberattack intervention crews,” the BTK maintains
that there is still a need for an additional “cyber
army.”91 However, it is not clear if these white hat
hackers will engage in activities other than securing
the country’s information and telecommunications
infrastructure. Given the expansion of online
surveillance and suppression in recent years, the
absence of a clear-cut job definition does indeed
raise concerns.

T. Sardan, ‘Siber Saldiriya Karsi 372 SOME,’ Milliyet,
January 22, 2016, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/sibersaldiriya-karsi-372-some--gundem-2182421/, (accessed
January 19, 2017)
91
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Conclusion
In their analysis of censorship and control of the
internet around the globe, Deibert and Rohozinski
discuss first, second and third-generation controls.
First-generation controls consist of internet filtering
and blocking; second-generation controls involve
the passing of legal restrictions, content removal
requests, technical shutdown of websites, and
computer-network attacks; and third-generation
controls include warrantless surveillance, the
creation of “national cyber-zones,” state-sponsored
information campaigns, and/or direct physical
action to silence individuals or groups.92
As the preceding overview of Turkey’s internet
policy between the late 1990s and the present
shows, there has been a marked shift from the
use of first to third-generation controls, and
from (more) formal and direct controls to (more)
informal and indirect practices of suppression.
This transformation is largely the result of the
Turkish authorities’ need to adapt to emerging
digital technologies and their affordances such as
public deliberation and political engagement. As
March Lynch notes in his “authoritarian persistence”
thesis, states adapt to the changes unleashed by
new communication technologies and learn how to
use the new powers of the internet as they go. In
response to emerging cultures of critique and new
forms of interaction between citizens and the state,
authoritarian regimes work constantly to contain
the mediated public sphere, and complement their
existing filtering, blocking, surveillance systems with
new strategies that de-centralize and distribute
control across platforms.
Between 2007 and 2013, a period when so-called
harmful online content and communications largely
transpired on websites, blogs, and social networking
and collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace,
Dailymotion, Vimeo and Blogspot), Turkish courts
and administrative entities relied largely on first
and second-generation controls. However, in the
aftermath of Gezi protests and the corruption
scandal in 2013, the AKP government became
acutely aware of the role of social media platforms
in political engagement and civic mobilization, and in
building and expanding of online/offline solidarities.
92
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Similar to authoritarian regimes that consider the
free flow of information a threat to their hegemony
and continuously adapt their media and information
management strategies to confine the networked
public sphere, the Turkish government too resorted
to third-generation controls. In the aftermath of the
abortive coup in 2016, the AKP has intensified its
attempts at controlling and taming the online public
sphere by way of regional internet shutdowns, cloud
and VPN restrictions, throttling, data localization
schemes, online “snitching” and prosecution, and
finally, covert but coordinated propaganda and
trolling operations.
The shift from formal, direct, hard forms of
control (e.g. legal and technical restrictions) to
informal, indirect, soft ones (e.g. throttling, snitching,
government-sponsored propaganda campaigns)
also points to the emergence of a decentralized
and distributed network of online censorship. In
the 2000s, online controls were implemented by a
centralized group of identifiable entities (TIB, BTK
and courts) via identifiable (if not always officially
acknowledged) strategies such as banning websites,
forbidding words from domain names, and denying
access to certain social media content. Beginning
in 2013 and escalating since 2016, online controls
have been carried out by a decentralized group that
includes the BTK, the courts, citizen informants and
government-affiliated trolls.
As noted above, the increasing agility and
diversity of internet controls is a necessity on the
part of authoritarian governments around the globe
to maintain and bolster regime stability in the face
of new political developments. In this regard, it is
important to discuss the recent changes in Turkey’s
internet policy with reference to those in China
and Russia—two authoritarian regimes (to varying
degrees) whose online control strategies serve as a
blueprint for budding autocrats around the world.
Analyses of China’s ICT policies show that Chinese
authorities rely on “public-private partnerships”
with the technology industry and a combination of
control, surveillance and activism. The deployment
of paid users to assist the government in “monitoring
content, making favorable comments, and pushing
discussion toward pro-Party lines” is an indication
of the emergence of a proactive censorship
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regime as opposed to a reactive one.93 Similarly,
Russia has moved beyond “strategies of ‘negative
control’ of the internet [i.e blocking, censoring, and
suppressing the flow of communication] toward
strategies of proactive co-optation [i.e. a deceptive
blend of control, co-option, and manipulation on
social media.]”94 As Gunitsky notes, the Russian
government, prompted by the anti-government
protests in 2011-2012, resorted to use social media
to maintain regime stability, and to this end, it
mobilized its own supporters (military and business
elites, regular citizens) and disseminated online
propaganda, both of which have complemented
each other and enabled the “planting of false
information, monitoring of opposition websites,
harassment of opposition members, and the shaping
of online discourse and public consciousness.”95
Russian authorities also formed “web brigades”
of hundreds of thousands of paid users to write
positive comments about the government, and thus
created a mechanism to “control the boundaries of
acceptable online debate” not simply by “blocking
dissent but by manipulating it.”96
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TURKEY’S INTERNET POLICY AFTER THE COUP ATTEMPT

As our analysis has shown, the Turkish government
also opted for a more decentralized set of controls
in the post-Gezi and post-coup conjunctures. Not
content with the legal, financial and political silencing
of critical voices in print and broadcast media, the
AKP government directed its attention to the last
bastion of free speech in the country, that is the
networked online sphere. Buttressing its existing
“negative” strategies implemented via the BTK and
the courts, it began to devolve responsibility for
internet control to partisan journalists, pundits
and trolls.
Additionally, it secured the active
engagement of the Turkish National Police, partisan
media outlets and NGOs, and its own voter base
to monitor online communications and to file
complaints against critical or dissenting websites,
Facebook pages, and Twitter users. In the postcoup period, the AKP has opted not to develop its
new censorship and silencing mechanisms into laws
and regulations, a strategy that resonates with the
Russian experience.97 By maintaining a high-level
of opacity to administrative and judicial decisions
concerning the blocking and banning of content,
and the prosecution of users, it has engendered a
sense of uncertainty and uneasiness in the online
public sphere.
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